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Money is central in US politics, and most campaign contributions stem from a tiny, wealthy
elite. Like other political acts, campaign donations are known to be socially contagious. We study
how campaign donations diffuse through a network of more than 50 000 elites and examine how
connectivity among previous donors reinforces contagion. We find that the diffusion of donations
is driven by independent reinforcement contagion: people are more likely to donate when exposed
to donors from different social groups than when they are exposed to equally many donors from
the same group. Counter-intuitively, being exposed to one side may increase donations to the other
side. Although the effect is weak, simultaneous cross-cutting exposure makes donation somewhat
less likely. Finally, the independence of donors in the beginning of a campaign predicts the amount
of money that is raised throughout a campaign. We theorize that people infer population-wide
estimates from their local observations, with elites assessing the viability of candidates, possibly
opposing candidates in response to local support. Our findings suggest that theories of complex
contagions need refinement and that political campaigns should target multiple communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
No money, no campaign is a truism in US politics.
Financing a campaign is vital for any candidate to get
elected. Contrary to appearances, most donations come
from individuals rather than corporations. While Obama
in 2008 attracted the most donors ever, reaching over
300 000 people [1], this still pales in comparison to the
US population of over 300 million. The elite thus have
a disproportionately large influence on campaigns and
politics generally [2].
The decision to donate or not, is not a purely individ-
ual one and is embedded in a wider social context [3].
People who are asked to contribute are much more likely
to do so [4]. Unsurprisingly, the wealthy are the most
likely to donate [4]. Most money comes from large do-
nations (i.e. ≥ $ 200), which must be registered with the
Federal Election Committee (FEC). The FEC is a federal
US agency tasked with the responsibility to administer
and enforce campaign finance legislation, which is a con-
tested subject in itself [5]. Exacerbating the inequality
in donations, the more wealthy and highly educated are
also more likely to be asked to donate [6, 7] to the extent
that when controlled for this selection bias, the effect
of asking may even disappear [8]. Such selection bias
leads to an even greater inequality in financial contribu-
tions [4]. The wealthy and highly educated are also more
likely to try to persuade others [9], while the influence is
stronger from people who are emotionally close [6]. Re-
search shows that individuals sitting on the same board
donate to similar candidates, and that this effect also
extends to members of interlocking boards [10]. Some
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scholars argued that spatial correlations in the geographi-
cal distribution of donations suggest they spread through
social networks [11, 12]. Personal contact is usually most
effective for recruitment [13], while field experiments with
canvassing also show contagious effects for turnout [14].
It is well known that most social contagion processes
are not simple epidemic contagions in which a single con-
tact is potentially sufficient for successful transmission of
some virus [15–19]. For social contagion to materialize,
social reinforcement is usually necessary, requiring mul-
tiple exposures to the behaviour before successful trans-
mission [20]. Many studies have analysed how the net-
work structure affects diffusion of behaviour [17, 21–26],
and different positions in the network may play different
roles [27] during the adoption life cycle. Nevertheless,
little attention has been paid to how connectivity among
adopters (i.e. donors) may affect contagion probabili-
ties [28]. We here focus on the question how likely some-
body is to adopt a certain behaviour (i.e. donating) given
the adopters among his or her network neighbours, and
pay particular attention to the connectivity among these
adopting neighbours. If somebody is exposed to adopters
who are all acquainted with one another, the probability
of that person adopting may be different from when none
of the adopters know each other. We here introduce two
different modes in which structure may affect contagion:
cohesive reinforcement and independent reinforcement.
If contagion is more likely when adopting neighbours
know each other we will speak of cohesive reinforce-
ment. In this case, ego (the focal node) is embed-
ded in a well-knit cohesive environment of adopters.
Such an environment is supportive and enables people to
take risky actions, knowing they are supported by their
friends [29]. It is also frequently a normative environ-
ment and part of the social influence is simply adhering
to group norms [30–32]. Failing to heed to the group’s
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2norms may lead to being ostracised, pressuring people
to adopt the behaviour and follow the group norms [33].
In the case of cohesive reinforcement contagion would be
especially likely if adopters come from the same group of
people. Take for example protesting: when four friends
participate but do not know each other, we may be less
inclined to join than when these four friends know each
other and we can participate as a group [34]. Such co-
hesive reinforcement may also play a role in collective
action more generally.
If contagion is more likely when adopting neighbours
don’t know each other, we will speak of independent re-
inforcement. In this setting, adopters from the same
group do not reinforce social contagion. In some way,
signals from the same group are redundant, which is con-
sistent with the strength of weak ties [35]: news passes
through weak links, crossing group boundaries. Informa-
tion from multiple sources is generally more credible [36],
but only if they are independent [37, 38]. Indeed, if multi-
ple sources are not independent, they are essentially seen
as a single independent source, and are no more persua-
sive than a single source [38]. Take for example informa-
tion pertaining to health: if four friends inform us that a
diet works well, this is more credible when these friends
do not know each other and reached this conclusion in-
dependently from one another than when they all know
each other (e.g. from a diet club), and have influenced
each other in believing that the diet works.
We analyse a network of over 50 000 elites coupled with
donation data to investigate the dynamics of this com-
plex contagion. Overall, the elite studied here follows
the classical definition of the “power elite” as conceptu-
alised by Mills [39]: they are mostly people in positions of
power, such as politicians, business leaders, lobbyists and
top bureaucrats, although there are also some exceptions,
such as academics and public intellectuals, but they are
relatively few. We examine whether contagion is driven
by cohesive reinforcement or independent reinforcement.
We further study cross-cutting exposure [40, 41]: how
exposure to Democratic donors affects donations to a Re-
publican candidate and vice versa. Finally, we examine
whether the micro level effect can be extrapolated to the
macro level by using the network structure to predict the
total amount of money raised. We report results for the
presidential election cycle of 2008 (January 1, 2007 to
December 31, 2008) for the Republican and Democratic
candidate in the main paper. Results for other campaigns
and for donations to the Democratic and Republican Na-
tional Committees can be found in Appendix B.
II. RESULTS
We use data gathered by LittleSis, a website that
tracks US elites, for constructing a network between elites
(see Appendix A). We construct the elite network based
on direct family, professional and social relations (which
constitute only a small fraction of relations), and indi-
rectly on having worked at the same firm, being alumni
of the same college or university, or being a member of the
same organization or club. As such, it is a multiplex net-
work, which may have effects on the interplay between
structure [42, 43] and dynamics [44]. As we will show
later, the multiplexity indeed has an impact on the way
donations diffuse. The LittleSis database also records
who donated how much to whom at what time. We study
how the probability to donate depends on donors in the
(network) neighbourhood. In complex contagions, the
probability to donate depends on the number of donors
in the network neighbourhood which we call the donor
degree. If contagion is reinforced through cohesion, only
donors who are part of the same community are relevant.
In particular, the maximum number of donors who come
from the same community should be pertinent, which
we call the common community donor degree. If con-
tagion takes places through independent reinforcement,
only independent exposures are considered. We oper-
ationalise this by counting the number of communities
from which at least one member has donated, which we
call the donor communities. Alternatively, we count the
types of sources that have donated (family, professional,
social, colleague, fellow alumni, fellow (club)member),
which we call source diversity. We discount any effect of
multiple exposures from similar sources. Notice this is
a measure of multiplex exposure: we count the number
of layers on which a node is exposed. These measures
are illustrated in Fig. 1, and are defined formally in Ap-
pendix A. We take a quarter as a unit of time, since the
daily dynamics exhibit clear dependencies on the (quar-
terly or monthly) FEC report deadlines (Fig. 2), as found
previously [45]. We pool data for all quarters.
A. Contagion of donation
The main question we address in this section is whether
contagion is driven by cohesive reinforcement or by inde-
pendent reinforcement. We first analyse whether dona-
tion is more likely when exposed to donors by studying
the effect of the donor degree. We then compare this to
the effect of the number of independent donors. This en-
tails comparing the effect of the (common community)
donor degree to the effect of donor communities and
source diversity. We first study this question by report-
ing the immediate effects of exposure. However, these
effects may be biased due to homophily—as we will ex-
plain later—and we therefore check our findings by con-
trolling for previous donations. Finally, we corroborate
our results using logistic regression in order to consider
all factors simultaneously.
The probability to donate in the next quarter clearly
depends on the donor degree (Fig. 3(a)). A person ex-
posed to a single donor is 1.7 times more likely to donate
than a person not exposed to any donor (χ2 = 71.6,
p = 2.68 × 10−17 for Democrats, results for Republi-
cans are comparable). The marginal effect of exposure
3Donor communities (3)
Donor degree (4)
Common community
donor degree (2)
Fig. 1. Network neighbourhood example. The fo-
cal node in the centre (square) is related to all the other
nodes (shown in light lines), who may be connected to each
other (shown in dark lines). The neighbourhood can be di-
vided into communities (shown in shades of green). Filled
nodes have donated, and the focal node is surrounded by four
donors, who are in three different communities, with a max-
imum of two nodes from the same community. The central
question is whether contagion of donation is driven by co-
hesive reinforcement—in which case the common community
donor degree should have a large effect—or by independent
reinforcement—in which case the donor communities should
have a large effect.
to more donors decreases: exposure to two donors makes
donation 1.23 times more likely than exposure to a single
donor (χ2 = 7.2, p = 0.0072); exposure to further donors
shows diminishing returns. There is hence a clear effect
of increasing exposure to donors. The marginal effect is
slightly stronger in the common community donor degree
(Fig. 3(b)), where exposure to a single donor makes do-
nation 1.8 times more likely than exposure to no donors
(χ2 = 101.8, p = 6.07 × 10−24). People exposed to two
donors from the same community are in turn 1.3 times
as likely to donate than people exposed to a single donor
(χ2 = 13.2, p = 0.000 29). The effect size of the common
community donor degree is only slightly stronger, making
the case for cohesive reinforcement not very strong.
The measures for independent reinforcement show
much stronger effects. Exposure to a single donor com-
munity makes donation 2.27 times more likely (χ2 =
320.5, p = 1.15×10−71). An additional donor community
makes donation 2.23 times more likely again (χ2 = 244.9,
p = 3.45× 10−55, Fig. 3(c)). The marginal effect dimin-
ishes: three donor communities make donation only 1.56
times more likely (χ2 = 32.3, p = 1.32 × 10−8), still
high compared to the effect of donor degree. Overall,
the probability to donate after exposure to two donor
communities is of the same order as the maximum effect
of donor degree (either overall or common community).
Indeed, when controlling for donor communities, donor
degree shows no significant effect. Independence mea-
sured in terms of source diversity shows even stronger
effects (Fig. 3(d)). Exposure to a single type of source in-
creases the likelihood of donation 2.56 times (χ2 = 467.2,
p = 1.31×10−103). A second type of source increases the
likelihood of donation a further 2.77 times (χ2 = 404.2,
p = 6.57 × 10−90). While exposure from a third type
of source increases the likelihood of donation again 2.19
times (χ2 = 37.8, p = 7.92 × 10−10), the effect weak-
ens thereafter. In short, there is evidence of independent
reinforcement.
One of the notorious problems of studying social con-
tagion is the problem of homophily [46]. People with
similar preferences are more likely to be connected [47],
so that exposure to donors does not necessarily causally
affect donation, but may simply reflect an underlying
similarity in preferences. Such homophilic links may
have consequences for how phenomena diffuse over net-
works [48–51]. Homophily can also create a selection bias
(treatment bias) as exposure to donors also depends on
underlying preferences, meaning that donors are more
likely to be exposed to other donors [46]. This problem
has previously been addressed by resorting to propensity
matching methods [46]. While it is impossible to com-
pletely resolve the confounding of homophily and social
contagion in observational studies [52], contagious effects
have also been documented in experimental studies [53].
The single best indicator of the underlying preference
for donating to a particular campaign is whether that
person has previously donated to other Democratic or
Republican candidates (Fig. 3(e)). Note that campaigns
often use previous donations to target likely donors [54],
so that controlling for previous donations effectively also
controls for selective targeting by campaigns. Previous
donation makes it more than 17 times more likely to do-
nate again (χ2 = 7801, p ≈ 0). We use this measure to
control for homophily. We cannot rule out other hidden
homophily that might explain any remaining network ef-
fects [52]. While other relevant co-variates are available
in the data (e.g. date of birth, gender, net worth), they
have not been as extensively coded, limiting their use-
fulness as control variables. Nevertheless, observing an
identical phenomenon (donation to a political candidate)
is a strong indicator that should account better than any
other measure for the effects of homophily on donation.
If we still see an effect of exposure to other donors af-
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Fig. 2. Donor dynamics. Daily donor dynamics (a) are affected by FEC deadlines (raw data is transparent, smoothed data
solid). The cumulative number of donors (b) shows the overall growth.
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Fig. 3. Contagion effects. The probability to donate based on (a) donor degree, (b) common community donor degree, (c)
donor communities, (d) source diversity and (e) previous donation.
ter controlling for previous donations—which is such a
strong predictor—then this strengthens the hypothesis
of social contagion.
We separate the effects of donor degree and donor com-
munities by previous donation (Fig. 4). Overall, dona-
tion is much more likely from old donors (those who
have previously donated) than from new donors (those
who have not), as said earlier. Exposure to a single
donor increases the likelihood 1.53 times for new donors
(χ2 = 10.3, p = 0.0013), and only 1.35 times for old
donors (χ2 = 18.4, p = 1.76 × 10−5). An additional ex-
posure increases the likelihood of donation a further 1.43
times for new donors (χ2 = 4.65, p = 0.031); for old
donors, additional exposure does not increase the prob-
ability of donation further. The effect is clearly stronger
for new donors than for old donors. The effect of inde-
pendent reinforcement is again much stronger, although
a similar difference between old and new donors is appar-
5ent. For new donors, the likelihood of donation is 2.24
times higher for a single community exposure (χ2 = 73.4,
p = 1.04 × 10−17), while for old donors this is only 1.58
(χ2 = 76.05, 2.77×10−18). An additional community ex-
posure for new donors makes donation 3.01 times more
likely (χ2 = 111.9, p = 3.80 × 10−26), while for old
donors donation is only 1.04 times more likely (χ2 = 0.42,
p = 0.52).
Logistic regression confirms that donor communities
have the strongest effect, and that the effects are stronger
for new donors than for old donors (Fig. 5, Tables S1
and S2). We also control for overall degree (i.e. not only
including donors), which has a slightly negative effect
(θ = −0.0040, t = −11.7, p = 1.40× 10−31) and cluster-
ing of a node, which has a somewhat stronger negative
effect (θ = −0.55, t = −7.95, p = 1.93 × 10−15). Hence,
hubs and brokers are less likely to donate overall. When
controlled for all other variables, donor degree actually
slightly decreases the chances of donation for a new donor
(θ = −0.032, t = −2.00, p = 0.046), but the effect is posi-
tive for old donors (θ = 0.015, t = 2.12, p = 0.034). Com-
mon community donor degree does have a positive effect
on new donors (θ = 0.098, t = 5.40, p = 6.63 × 10−8)
and old donors (θ = 0.033, t = 4.04, p = 5.41 × 10−5),
multiplying the odds of donation about 1.10 times and
1.03 times for each additional common community donor
degree. Donor communities have a much stronger effect
on new donors (θ = 0.67, t = 8.55, p = 1.24 × 10−17),
increasing the odds of donation 1.95 times for each ad-
ditional community, but have no significant effect on old
donors (p = 0.38). Finally, source diversity has no sig-
nificant effect for new donors (p = 0.61), but does have
a clear positive effect on old donors (θ = 0.33, t = 6.19,
p = 6.03 × 10−10), increasing the odds of donation 1.39
times. The strongest effect clearly remains previous do-
nation (θ = 3.13, t = 41.05, p ≈ 0), increasing the odds
23 times.
In conclusion, we find that the contagion of donation
is mostly driven by independent reinforcement contagion.
For new donors, the number of communities has a much
larger effect than donor degree (either overall or commu-
nity degree). Donations in their neighbourhood increase
the likelihood of donation, especially when the previous
donors come from different social groups. For old donors,
the effects are typically much weaker or even insignifi-
cant. Their decision to donate is largely independent of
donations in their neighbourhood. The presidential elec-
tion campaign of 2008 discussed here shows the clear-
est effects, perhaps related to the unexpected success of
Barack Obama. Results for other election cycles of 2000,
2004 and 2012 and for party donations—to the Demo-
cratic National Committee (DNC) or Republican Na-
tional Committee (RNC)—are qualitatively similar (see
Figs. S1–S8 and Tables S1–S8 in Appendix B).
Cross-cutting exposure
In the previous section, we found that exposure to
Democratic donors makes donation to the Democratic
candidate much more likely (and similarly so for Repub-
licans), especially for new donors that are exposed to
multiple independent donors. It is possible that dona-
tion is also affected by the amount of support for the op-
posing party. For example, if somebody is equally much
exposed to Democratic and Republican donors, it might
put him or her in a rather difficult position: should (s)he
support the Democratic or the Republican candidate?
One possibility is that (s)he donates to neither, to pre-
vent possible conflicts, which was found to be the case
for voting [40]. In this section we analyse the effects of
this so-called cross-cutting exposure to the “other” party
(i.e. the effect of Democratic exposure on Republican
donations and vice-versa).
Cross-cutting exposure has a counter-intuitive effect.
If there are relatively more Democrats (taking the dif-
ference between the number of Democrats and Republi-
cans), this not only increases the likelihood of donations
to the Democratic candidate, but also to the Republican
candidate (Fig. 6). Exposure to one more Democrat than
Republican donor increases the likelihood of donations
to Republicans 1.28 times (χ2 = 11.2, p = 8.39× 10−4).
While Republican donations continue to increase with
further exposure to Democratic donors, none of the re-
maining consecutive differences are significant. The effect
of relatively more exposure to Republican donors remains
greater, with a single exposure making Republican dona-
tions 1.46 times more likely (χ2 = 28.2, p = 1.09×10−7).
The effect seems less pronounced for the relative number
of communities in this analysis.
However, logistic regression shows that exposure to
Democratic donor communities increases the odds of do-
nation to a Republican candidate (θ = 0.62, t = 2.73,
p = 0.0063), and that none of the other Democratic ex-
posure measures are significant (Fig. 7). In fact, the
effect of Democratic donor communities is higher than
Republican donor communities for Republican donations
(θ = 0.39, t = 1.47, p = 0.14). The inverse is not
significant—exposure to Republican communities does
not increase donation to the Democratic candidate signif-
icantly. For Democratic donations, the interaction of ex-
posure to Democratic and Republican community donors
is −0.15 (t = −2.10, p = 0.036), but this is not significant
for Republican donations (p = 0.13). Similarly, the inter-
action of Democratic and Republican common commu-
nity donor degree has a slight negative effect on Demo-
cratic donations (θ = −0.0031, t = −2.51 p = 0.012),
which is again not significant for Republican donations.
This implies that when simultaneously exposed to both
Republicans and Democrats, Democratic donations may
become less likely, in line with previous results [40], but
this is not the case for Republican donations.
Interestingly, effects of cross-cutting exposure vary per
campaign. For example, while Republican donations
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Fig. 4. Conditional donation probability. Donation conditional on previous donation differs for (a,c) donor degree and
(b,d) donor communities, with the effects for new donors being larger.
were more likely after exposure to Democratic donors
in the 2008 election, the reverse was true in 2004: ex-
posure to Republican donors triggered Democratic do-
nations (Figs. S3 and S4). Another example, in the
2012 election, any community exposure (either to Demo-
cratic or Republican donors) led to Republican party do-
nations and neither had an impact on Democratic do-
nations (Figs. S7 and S8). See Appendix B for further
details on cross-cutting effects for other election cycles.
This may suggest that such cross-cutting exposure may
be triggered by specific dynamics of some campaigns. We
briefly discuss this further in Section III.
B. Overall campaign
We have seen that, at a micro level, when somebody
is exposed to multiple independent donors, (s)he is more
likely to donate. This micro effect can possibly also have
network wide repercussions at a macro level. We may
expect that the total extent of the diffusion is greater if
people from different communities have donated than if
equally many people have donated from the same com-
munity. We here briefly investigate whether this extrap-
olation of the micro effect to the macro level holds.
Following the extrapolation, the number of communi-
ties that donate at some point should be indicative of
the amount of money raised afterwards. To test this, we
try to predict the total amount of money wi raised in a
certain election cycle for any candidate (including sen-
atorial, congressional and presidential elections) based
on the first quarter (Fig. 8) The total amount of money
raised throughout the campaign largely depends on the
amount of money raised in the first quarter wi(1), and
we find that wˆi = αwi(1)
β predicts wi fairly well with
α = 32.1±4.2 and β = 0.90±0.0086. Taking into account
the number of communities that have donated in the first
quarter ci(1) as wˆi = αwi(1)
βci(1)
γ with α = 21.6± 3.7,
β = 0.81± 0.015, and γ = 0.42± 0.070 slightly improves
the fit, and is clearly favoured (∆AIC = 30.32). The
number of donors itself has no significant effect and ac-
tually degrades the fit, clearly favouring the model using
the number of communities. Both β and γ < 1, so that
additional donations and independent donors yield di-
minishing returns. Every doubling of the amount raised
in the first quarter multiplies the total amount by roughly
1.75. Doubling the initial number of communities multi-
plies the total amount by about 1.34, while doubling the
initial number of donors has no significant effect. This
small exercise demonstrates that the effect of indepen-
dent donors not only holds at the micro level, but can
also be extrapolated to the macro level.
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III. DISCUSSION
We find that political campaign donations among elite
are socially contagious. Being exposed to other donors
increases chances of donation significantly, also after con-
trolling for previous donations. Contagion is especially
likely after multiple exposures from different communi-
ties or from different types of sources (e.g. family, friends,
business partners). This supports the idea of indepen-
dent reinforcement of complex social contagions.
Our results show that having a multiplex view of a
network may be important for understanding the diffu-
sion process. In particular, the perceived independence
of people may be difficult to asses without distinguishing
different types of links. Some of this information may
also be contained in the “flat” network (where we disre-
gard the type of a link) depending on how the structure is
correlated between different multiplex layers. If there is a
positive correlation between two layers, a single commu-
nity in the flat network may consist of multiple types of
links, while if this correlation is negative, different types
of links are likely to be contained within different com-
munities. The latter seems to be the case for the Little-
Sis data, where only about 3 000 links out of more than
1.6 million links are of more than one type, explaining
the congruency between community degree and different
types of sources.
We theorize that people infer population-wide be-
haviour by observing their local networks. Such local
observations are necessarily biased, as they are influenced
by homophily and other selection effects. One reasonable
heuristic for trying to surmount such bias would be to
only use observations that are as independent as possible.
Whenever ego knows two observations are not indepen-
dent, (s)he only counts them as one [38]; (s)he discards
redundant observations. Alternatively, if two persons of
the same background show the same behaviour, people
attribute it to those particular characteristics or group
membership [55], whereas if two people act the same but
have very different backgrounds, people attribute the be-
haviour to its popularity. Stated differently: people infer
that the TV show The Big Bang Theory is widely popu-
lar when not only their geek friends watch it, but when
friends from all backgrounds watch it. It would be inter-
esting to further examine this hypothesis of attribution
bias [56]. This is consistent with the idea of the “majority
illusion”, generalizing local observations to population-
wide estimates leading to a locality bias [57].
It is well known that viability of candidates plays a
major role in campaign donations [58–60]. Campaign do-
nations play an especially important role during primary
nominations [61, 62], as do (party) elites more gener-
ally [63]. When a candidate’s success seems out of reach,
people are reluctant to donate. After all, supporting a
(guaranteed) losing candidate simply squanders money,
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that exposure to one side can increase donations to the other side.
which could be allocated to a more viable candidate. Us-
ing independent observations to infer the viability of can-
didates seems a good heuristic, especially early on in the
campaign when candidates are not yet widely known. We
theorize that independent reinforcement is especially rel-
evant for campaign donations to assess viability.
More generally speaking, we hypothesize that complex
contagion with independent reinforcement is especially
likely with population-wide network externalities—if the
value of the behaviour depends on the number of people
showing such behaviour [64]. A previous study of conta-
gion in signing up to Facebook reported similar results
to our own [28]; a clear case of behaviour with network
externalities—using a social network site is only useful if
enough other people use it. Cases where network exter-
nalities are present are abundant, ranging from commu-
nication devices and services to file formats and techni-
cal standards [65]. In such situations we expect complex
contagions to be driven by independent reinforcement.
However, not all network externalities necessarily lead
to independent reinforcement. For example, in the pres-
ence of a public goods dilemma or a collective action
problem, we may expect cohesive reinforcement rather
than independent reinforcement. If two alters are un-
related (such that ego is the broker between these two
alters), this may make coordination between the three
more difficult; when the alters do know each other, it
may facilitate communication and thereby agreement
on a common course of action. Especially when the
stakes are high, failing to coordinate an action can
be costly, thereby making cohesive reinforcement more
likely. While cascades of cooperation have been observed
to take place in experimental studies of public goods [66–
69], it is an open question whether such effects are driven
by cohesive or independent reinforcement contagion.
Alternatively, if a network externality depends not on
the number of people, but on the connections between
them, we may expect cohesive reinforcement. Take the
mundane example of hanging out at a bar with friends.
The joy of such an activity depends not on the number of
friends itself, but on whether those friends also know each
other and enjoy spending time with each other. Similarly,
team performance may not depend so much on the num-
ber of people, but on how they are connected [70, 71],
favouring cohesive reinforcement.
Inferring population-wide estimates from local obser-
vations may not only have positive contagious effects.
Knowing that sufficient people are already contributing
to a public good may make it less likely for people to
contribute themselves [68, 69]. When estimates of con-
tribution to a public good are derived from local esti-
mates, we may see a negative contagion effect. In our
case, this could explain the counter-intuitive finding that
exposure to one side can trigger donations to the other
side. Here, people could deem it necessary to rally sup-
port for their candidate of choice because they observe
too much support for the opponent. In the 2004 cam-
paign, when George W. Bush was seeking re-election,
potential Democratic donors may have been reacting to
exposure to donations to Bush to oppose his candidacy.
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Similarly in the 2008 campaign, potential Republican
donors may have wanted to oppose Obama’s election.
More generally speaking, people may react to their local
estimate of population-wide behaviour rather than the
actual population-wide behaviour.
Our findings may also have implications for recommen-
dation systems in online social networks [72]. It may be
more relevant what story or product is liked or bought by
many independent friends than by friends from the same
social group. This is also what the results of the study on
joining Facebook suggests [28]: the adoption of the ser-
vice depends on the number of independent friends that
have joined Facebook. However, this may depend on the
type of product which is recommended.
The two different modes of complex contagion also af-
fect the speed of the spreading process on networks [23,
73]. Independent reinforcement has a relatively slow and
steady rate of diffusion in clustered networks, as addi-
tional contagions in the local neighbourhood are redun-
dant and do not reinforce contagion. In contrast to cohe-
sive reinforcement, independent reinforcement may per-
meate group boundaries. Depending on the type of con-
tagion and the type of network, we may expect different
dynamics, which should be explored further.
Finally, as we stated at the outset, money is vital to
any political campaign in the US. Raising money is a cru-
cial short-term goal in order to further the end goal of
getting elected. Our findings suggest that appealing to
constituencies of diverse backgrounds may actually aid
in diffusing support through networks. Moreover, the
number of communities that have donated is significantly
predictive of total fund-raising capabilities, whereas the
number of donors is not. The number of communities
was also found to be predictive of the virality of online
memes [74]. While this is congruent with the idea that
independent reinforcement takes place on the network,
it could also indicate the candidate’s more widespread
appeal—both interpretations support the strategy of tar-
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geting people in communities that have not yet donated.
Doubling the amount of money raised but only targeting
the same communities only multiplies the total amount
by about 1.75, while doubling the number of communi-
ties at the same time more than doubles the amount of
money, resulting in a super-linear scaling. Contagious
effects may multiply the efforts of fund-raising, and they
should be taken into account. This suggests a (perhaps
counter-intuitive) change to fund-raising strategy, sug-
gested earlier in a study on soliciting donations [8]: it
may be more effective to target people who are rela-
tively difficult to recruit, rather than the easy picks. Al-
though targeting likely donors may seem to have greater
direct effects with relatively more people assenting to the
request—targeting various groups may have a larger ef-
fect overall because donations are more likely to spread,
even though fewer may immediately assent to the re-
quest. We consider this a hopeful sign, suggesting that
rather than addressing narrow interests and petty con-
cerns, politicians should appeal to the general population
and the greater good.
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Appendix A: Materials and Methods
1. LittleSis
LittleSis (as the opposite of Big Brother) is a web-
site launched in 2009 to track US elites, including busi-
ness leaders, lobbyists, politicians, bankers, top bureau-
crats and others, totalling over 120 000 persons. In ad-
dition, LittleSis provides data on over 40 000 organiza-
tions, including firms, labour unions, universities and pri-
vate clubs. Persons and organizations are tied to each
other in several ways, detailing what positions people
held in which organizations, where they were educated
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and of which organizations they are members. The web-
site also details family, social and other professional links
between elites. Last but not least, the website holds ex-
tensive records of who donated to whom, in the context
of political campaigns, obtained from the Federal Elec-
tion Committee (FEC). The LittleSis project is main-
tained by the Public Accountability Initiative, a non-
profit, non-partisan organization. It gathers this infor-
mation from a variety of public sources, and brings it
together in a single searchable interface, providing easy
access to journalists and scholars trying to untangle the
web of influence. Alongside making this information pub-
licly available through a search interface and a Web API,
the LittleSis project renders a complete (SQL) database
dump available upon request, which we use for our anal-
ysis. Although all information is publicly available, we
anonymised all data since identifying information plays
no role in our analysis.
We constructed a network between all people included
in the database. We did so based on direct family, profes-
sional and social relations (which constitute only a small
fraction of relations), and indirectly on having worked
at the same firm, being alumni of the same college or
university, or being a member of the same organization
or club. These indirect links only provide some indica-
tion of a possible connection between people, and not all
connections are guaranteed to exist in reality. Assuming
that the number of connections people have to (former)
colleagues, fellow alumni or fellow members is limited,
the probability that two people actually have a connec-
tion generally decreases with the size of the organisation.
We therefore restrict these indirect links to organizations
having fewer than 300 members in the LittleSis database.
To check for the robustness of our results with respect to
this cut-off, we also run all analyses with a cut-off of
250 members and 500 members, and find that the re-
sults remain qualitatively the same. Out of the nearly
120 000 people, 61 196 had at least one type of link, and
we only used the largest connected component which in-
cludes 55 435 people.
The network is quite clustered (clustering coefficient
0.87), and has a quite high average degree of 58.5. To get
an idea of the type of links connecting members of the US
elite in the LittleSis database, we remove specific types
of links and look at the size of the remaining largest con-
nected component. Business relations hold most of the
network together, resulting in a largest connected com-
ponent of only a quarter after removing them. This is not
surprising, as business relations also comprise most of the
links. Family relations have a surprisingly large impact
on connectivity compared to organization membership.
Although both membership and family reduce the largest
component by about 4%, the latter needs only 0.19% of
the links to do so, while the first needs more than 14% to
do the same, so that removing a family link reduces the
largest component on average by 0.64 nodes. Similarly,
professional and social relations reduce the largest com-
ponent on average by respectively 0.42 and 0.61 nodes
per link. The indirect relations (membership, education
and business) remove only very few nodes per link. Un-
derstandable, given that all people associated with the
same organization are connected to each other, thereby
creating many redundant links. The indirect links are es-
sential in connecting the network. Unfortunately, there is
no way of telling whether two people connected through
such an indirect link actually know each other, less so
whether they have exchanged information regarding their
donations. The use of such indirect links is a limitation
of the LittleSis data, and preferably our results should
be checked against more accurate network data (which,
unfortunately, is more difficult to gather). Of course,
even for direct links, we cannot ascertain whether people
have actually exchanged information on their donations.
However, such (indirect) links indicate there is a certain
probability for the flow of such information, and that
hence exposure did take place.
2. Modelling contagion
For each donation, we know who donated to whom
and when. We use time to analyse how donations dif-
fuse through the network G = (V,E) with nodes V and
links E. For each time step we study how the donation
probability depends on donors in the (network) neigh-
bourhood. Formally speaking, let Yi(t) denote the fact
that person i has donated at time t to a certain cam-
paign. We then try to predict Yi(t) based on Yj(τ) for
τ < t for neighbours j of i (i.e. if (ij) ∈ E). For con-
venience we set Xi(t) = 1 if Yi(τ) = 1 for any τ ≤ t
and Xi(t) = 0 otherwise, that is Xi(t) = maxτ≤t Yi(τ)
indicates whether i has donated before (or at) time t.
People may donate multiple times to the same campaign
(once in the primary and once in the general election
for example), but we only study contagion for the first
donation as later donations are most likely caused by
the first donation rather than through contagion. We
model Pr(Yi(t) = 1 | Xi(t− 1) = 0) = f(θ,Ni, X(t− 1))
where Ni is the subgraph induced by the neighbours
{j|(ij) ∈ E} and θ some parameters.
We use several characteristics of the neighbourhood
graph Ni for predicting donation. We call the number
of neighbours the degree ki = |V (Ni)|, and the den-
sity of the connections among the neighbours is called
the clustering coefficient, which is ci =
2mi
ki(ki−1) , where
mi = |E(Ni)| is the number of links in the neighbour-
hood graph. The nodes that have donated before or
at time t are denoted by D(t) = {i | Xi(t) = 1}.
The number of donating neighbours is the donor degree
kdonori = |D(t)∩Ni|. We denote by σj the community of
node j, detected for each neighbourhood graph Ni sepa-
rately. That is, we detect communities for each Ni, and
σj is the community of node j with respect to the neigh-
bourhood graph Ni. Detecting communities at the local
level of the neighbourhood graphs is consistent with how
they are perceived by ego. We detect communities using
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the Louvain algorithm [75] to optimize modularity [76].
Although modularity has difficulty detecting communi-
ties in large graphs [77], the neighbourhood graphs Ni
are generally quite small, so this should not be a problem.
Detecting communities at the overall network level G
does not yield the same results, and exposure measured in
this way yields weaker effects. We operationalise cohesive
reinforcement as the number of donors that come from
the same community. We take the maximum number of
donors who come from the same community, ignoring any
exposure from other communities with fewer donors. We
call this the common community donor degree which is
kccdi = maxc |{j | σj = c and j ∈ D(t) ∩ Ni}|. We oper-
ationalise independent reinforcement by considering the
number of different communities that have donated; ex-
posure from multiple donors from the same community
is ignored. We simply count the number of communi-
ties which have donors, which we call the donor com-
munities: cdonori = |{σj | j ∈ D(t) ∩ Ni}|, which is a
proper set so that multiple σj are only counted once.
Note that ki ≥ kdonori ≥ cdonori and kdonori ≥ kccdi but
that cdonori and k
ccd
i are not directly related, except that
kccdi +c
donor
i ≤ kdonori +1. As an additional operationalisa-
tion of independent reinforcement, we count the number
of different types of channels through which contagion
can take place: family, professional, social, (former) col-
leagues, fellow alumni or fellow members, which we call
source diversity. These measures are illustrated in Fig. 1.
To establish previous donation for candidates, we took
into account all donations to all political candidates
(senatorial, congressional, gubernatorial, presidential, et
cetera) prior to the start of the election cycle. For party
donations, previous donations are more straightforward,
and we simply check whether somebody donated to the
party prior to the start of the election cycle.
We use logistic regression, which is of the form
Pr(Yi(t) = 1 | Xi(t− 1) = 0) = 1
1 + exp(−θX) (A1)
where θ are parameters and X contains the covariates
used in the specific model. Since we pool the results for
all quarters, we cluster errors on the donor for robust
results. Logistic regression is inherently similar to com-
plex contagion and can be seen as a smooth approxima-
tion of a threshold model [20]. Simple contagion would
take another functional form. Assuming each contagion
is equally likely for each contact with some probability
p, then the probability of infection with exposure to k
adopters is 1 − (1 − p)k at each time step. Fitting this
model gave poor results, corroborating that the conta-
gion of donations is not well modelled by simple conta-
gion.
Appendix B: Detailed results
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Fig. S2. Results for parties, election 2000. Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data is solid— and
cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor communities, (f)
source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for new donors, and
(j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new donors for donor
degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity (q)–(r). Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Fig. S3. Results for presidential candidates, election 2004. Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data
is solid— and cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor
communities, (f) source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for
new donors, and (j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new
donors for donor degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity
(q)–(r). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Fig. S4. Results for parties, election 2004. Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data is solid— and
cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor communities, (f)
source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for new donors, and
(j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new donors for donor
degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity (q)–(r). Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Fig. S5. Results for presidential candidates, election 2008. Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data
is solid— and cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor
communities, (f) source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for
new donors, and (j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new
donors for donor degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity
(q)–(r). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Fig. S6. Results for parties, election 2008. Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data is solid— and
cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor communities, (f)
source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for new donors, and
(j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new donors for donor
degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity (q)–(r). Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Fig. S7. Results for presidential candidates, election 2012. Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data
is solid— and cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor
communities, (f) source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for
new donors, and (j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new
donors for donor degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity
(q)–(r). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Fig. S8. Results for parties, election 2012 Daily donors (a)—raw data is transparent, smoothed data is solid— and
cumulative donors (b), probability effect of (c) donor degree, (d) common community donor degree, (e) donor communities, (f)
source diversity and (g) previous donation. Logistic regression results (h) general effects, (i) network effects for new donors, and
(j) network effects for old donors. Logistic regression result for cross-cutting effects, distinguished by old/new donors for donor
degree (k)–(l), common community donor degree (m)–(n), donor communities (o)–(p), and source diversity (q)–(r). Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients.
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Dependent variable: donation to democratic candidate
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -7.5† -6.9† -6.2† -8.4†
Donated previously 3.8† 3.5† 3.1† 4.4†
Degree −1.3 × 10−3* −2.7 × 10−3† −4.0 × 10−3† −2.8× 10−3†
Clustering -0.52*** -0.25** -0.55† -0.43†
Donor degree -0.038 -0.098* -0.032* -0.10
Donor degree × Donated previously 0.036 0.077 0.047** 0.091
Donor communities 0.40* 0.47** 0.67† 0.64
Donor communities × Donated previously -0.37 -0.37* -0.63† -0.53
Donor source diversity 0.30 0.58*** 0.057 0.62
Donor source diversity × Donated previously -0.20 -0.24 0.27* -0.25
Common community donor degree 0.089 0.16*** 0.098† 0.18*
Common community donor degree × Donated previously -0.079 -0.10* -0.065** -0.10
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S1. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the democratic candidate as dependent variable.
Dependent variable: donation to republican candidate
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -5.8† -6.2† -7.0† -7.4†
Donated previously 3.5† 3.6† 3.5† 4.0†
Degree 5.0× 10−3† 3.5 × 10−3† −1.6× 10−3† −1.1× 10−3***
Clustering -0.67† -0.49† -0.22** -0.38†
Donor degree -0.041* -0.044** -0.042 -0.064
Donor degree × Donated previously 4.0× 10−3 0.030 0.044 0.052
Donor communities 0.19* 0.26** 0.43*** 0.31
Donor communities × Donated previously -0.44† -0.37† -0.29* -0.11
Donor source diversity -0.083 0.11 0.25 0.55*
Donor source diversity × Donated previously 0.15 -0.022 -0.081 -0.33
Common community donor degree -0.016 0.040* 0.068 0.096*
Common community donor degree × Donated previously -0.011 -0.059** -0.044 -0.065
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S2. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the republican candidate as dependent variable.
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Dependent variable: donation to democratic party
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -6.3† -6.0† -6.4† -7.6†
Donated previously 3.7† 3.6† 3.6† 4.7†
Degree −2.1× 10−3† −3.1 × 10−3† −2.2 × 10−3† −5.1× 10−4
Clustering -0.90† -0.74† -0.99† -0.78†
Donor degree -0.036 -0.12 -0.078 -0.043
Donor degree × Donated previously −5.3× 10−3 1.1× 10−3 -0.053 0.019
Donor communities 0.48* 0.64† 0.39 0.14
Donor communities × Donated previously -0.29 -0.40 3.5 × 10−3 -0.095
Donor source diversity 0.54** 0.53*** 0.82*** 0.88***
Donor source diversity × Donated previously -0.37 -0.28 -0.73* -0.81**
Common community donor degree 0.21* 0.26† 0.18 0.19*
Common community donor degree × Donated previously -0.055 -0.059 0.054 -0.19
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S3. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the democratic party as dependent variable.
Dependent variable: donation to republican party
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -6.2† -6.2† -6.1† -6.4†
Donated previously 3.8† 3.9† 3.7† 3.7†
Degree −1.2× 10−3** −1.0 × 10−3** −3.2× 10−3† −1.1 × 10−3**
Clustering -0.88† -0.87† -0.77† -0.92†
Donor degree -0.31*** -0.090* -0.045 -0.083*
Donor degree × Donated previously 0.21 6.0× 10−3 0.058 0.055
Donor communities 1.0† 0.75† 0.66† 0.65†
Donor communities × Donated previously -1.0** -0.62† -0.55† -0.49***
Donor source diversity 0.11 0.26* 0.27 0.27
Donor source diversity × Donated previously 0.15 -0.12 -0.052 -0.20
Common community donor degree 0.40† 0.14*** 0.13** 0.15†
Common community donor degree × Donated previously -0.22 −9.6 × 10−3 -0.077 -0.070
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S4. Lofiguregistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the republican party as dependent variable.
24
Dependent variable: donation to democratic candidate
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -7.6† -6.9† -6.2† -8.8†
Degree 1.8 × 10−3** −2.8 × 10−3† −4.9× 10−3† −2.6 × 10−3†
Clustering -0.46** -0.35† -0.64† -0.47†
Donated previously (D) 4.1† 3.7† 3.2† 4.9†
Donor degree
D -0.022 −9.8 × 10−3 0.018 0.24
R 2.6 × 10−3 0.014 0.077 0.14
D × R 1.4 × 10−3 −1.0 × 10−3 −6.2× 10−4 −9.3 × 10−3
× Donated previously (D)
D 0.057 0.022 −5.9× 10−3 -0.22
R 0.012 -0.013 -0.10* -0.13
D × R −3.2× 10−3 7.5 × 10−4 8.4 × 10−4 8.7× 10−3
Donor communities
D 1.3† 0.50 0.84† -0.11
R 0.47 0.36* 0.26 -0.22
D × R -0.47** -0.15 -0.15* 0.11
× Donated previously (D)
D -0.96** -0.58* -0.84† 0.10
R -0.63 -0.60** -0.33 0.23
D × R 0.41* 0.22* 0.19* -0.093
Donor source diversity
D -0.81* 0.41 -0.15 1.8**
R -0.62 -0.21 -0.25 1.1
D × R 0.64** 0.093 0.053 -0.93*
× Donated previously (D)
D 0.61 0.15 0.50* -1.3
R 0.37 0.50 0.23 -1.2
D × R -0.49* -0.26 -0.070 0.89*
Common community donor degree
D 0.16 0.13* 0.10** -0.14
R -0.050 8.3× 10−3 -0.047 -0.15
D × R −9.3× 10−3* −2.9 × 10−3 −3.1× 10−3* 8.4× 10−3
× Donated previously (D)
D -0.17 -0.078 -0.047 0.20
R -0.049 0.015 0.11 0.15
D × R 0.012* 1.4× 10−3 1.3 × 10−3 −9.7 × 10−3
D = Democrat, R = Republican ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S5. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the democratic candidate as dependent variable, including
cross-exposure effects (i.e. effect of exposure to democratic donors on republican donation).
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Dependent variable: donation to republican candidate
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -5.8† -6.1† -7.2† -7.7†
Degree 7.0× 10−3† 4.7 × 10−3† −2.5× 10−3† −1.3× 10−3***
Clustering -0.74† -0.50† -0.25** -0.44†
Donated previously (R) 3.6† 3.8† 3.8† 4.3†
Donor degree
D -0.10 1.7 × 10−3 -0.010 0.041
R −2.9 × 10−3 7.3× 10−3 0.021 1.6 × 10−3
D × R 1.6 × 10−5 −4.3 × 10−4 −9.6× 10−4 9.7× 10−4
× Donated previously (R)
D -0.070 -0.13* 0.039 -0.051
R -0.017 −9.5 × 10−3 0.023 0.033
D × R 4.9 × 10−4 9.3× 10−4 3.3 × 10−4 −1.4 × 10−3
Donor communities
D 0.021 -0.036 0.62** 0.31
R 0.18 0.30** 0.39 0.47
D × R -0.024 -0.088 -0.13 -0.21
× Donated previously (R)
D -0.070 -0.064 -0.74** -0.18
R -0.48*** -0.39** -0.25 -0.29
D × R 0.040 0.077 0.13 0.18
Donor source diversity
D -0.057 2.8× 10−3 -0.11 0.31
R 0.047 -0.027 0.31 0.41
D × R -0.077 0.014 -0.13 -0.22
× Donated previously (R)
D -0.064 -0.019 0.16 -0.43
R 0.11 -0.078 -0.20 -0.17
D × R 0.083 0.091 0.13 0.17
Common community donor degree
D 0.079 -0.030 0.035 0.064
R -0.075 −6.1 × 10−4 0.033 0.077
D × R 1.7 × 10−3 −4.8 × 10−4 −1.4× 10−3 -0.011**
× Donated previously (R)
D 0.071 0.097 -0.031 −4.6 × 10−3
R 0.039 -0.026 -0.020 -0.061
D × R −3.0× 10−3 1.0× 10−3 −1.7× 10−4 6.0× 10−3
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S6. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the republican candidate as dependent variable, including
cross-exposure effects (i.e. effect of exposure to democratic donors on republican donation).
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Dependent variable: donation to democratic party
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -6.3† -6.2† -6.6† -7.7†
Degree −2.9 × 10−3† −4.2× 10−3† −3.5 × 10−3† 8.1 × 10−5
Clustering -0.89† -0.71† -0.98† -0.73†
Donated previously (D) 3.7† 3.7† 3.7† 4.8†
Donor degree
D -0.084 -0.025 4.1× 10−3 0.071
R -0.033 -0.041 7.0× 10−3 0.16
D × R 7.8× 10−3 2.6 × 10−3* 2.1× 10−3 −4.9× 10−3
× Donated previously (D)
D 0.029 -0.095 -0.078 -0.080
R -0.44 -0.068 -0.24 -0.27
D × R 0.012 2.0 × 10−3 6.9× 10−4 −1.9× 10−3
Donor communities
D 0.83** 0.76*** 0.57 0.12
R 0.38 0.72† 0.86† 0.036
D × R -0.20 -0.19** -0.23** -0.080
× Donated previously (D)
D -0.70 -0.57 -0.32 -0.014
R 0.70 -0.44 -0.76** 0.22
D × R 0.085 0.18* 0.29* 0.072
Donor source diversity
D 0.081 0.45 0.64 0.91*
R -0.074 -0.21 -0.28 -0.18
D × R 0.22 -0.048 −8.5 × 10−3 −6.8× 10−3
× Donated previously (D)
D 0.15 -0.14 -0.46 -1.0*
R -0.58 0.25 0.40 -0.49
D × R -0.21 -0.044 -0.076 0.29
Common community donor degree
D 0.28 0.17** 0.076 0.13
R 0.14 0.078 0.034 -0.13
D × R -0.024* −8.1× 10−3* −6.9× 10−3 −5.6× 10−3
× Donated previously (D)
D -0.088 0.038 0.11 -0.14
R 0.48 0.10 0.32* 0.18
D × R -0.022 −4.7× 10−3 −4.7× 10−3 0.020
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S7. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the democratic party as dependent variable, including
cross-exposure effects (i.e. effect of exposure to republican donors on democratic donation).
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Dependent variable: donation to republican party
Variable 2000 2004 2008 2012
Intercept -6.3† -6.3† -6.2† -6.6†
Degree −2.2 × 10−3† −1.0 × 10−3** −3.9× 10−3† −2.1 × 10−3†
Clustering -0.88† -0.90† -0.78† -0.88†
Donated previously (R) 4.0† 4.0† 3.8† 3.9†
Donor degree
D 0.12 -0.076 0.052 -0.024
R 0.14 0.037 0.097* 0.13*
D × R -0.041* −1.7 × 10−3 −3.5× 10−3 −7.3 × 10−3
× Donated previously (R)
D 0.19 -0.23 -0.059 0.029
R -0.042 -0.082 -0.034 -0.095
D × R 9.9 × 10−3 4.8× 10−5 2.3 × 10−3 6.3× 10−3
Donor communities
D 0.052 -0.040 0.22 0.90†
R 0.74** 0.63† 0.42** 0.78†
D × R -0.037 −2.4 × 10−3 -0.021 -0.24***
× Donated previously (R)
D 0.61 0.34 -0.19 -0.68*
R -0.60 -0.65** -0.44* -0.63**
D × R -0.15 0.070 0.046 0.20*
Donor source diversity
D 0.72* 0.54 0.44 -0.45
R 0.48 0.44** 0.47* -0.092
D × R -0.56*** -0.31* -0.33** 0.13
× Donated previously (R)
D -1.5* -0.80 -0.35 0.31
R -0.38 -0.19 -0.21 0.061
D × R 0.73* 0.25 0.28 -0.10
Common community donor degree
D 0.037 0.097 0.047 0.15
R -0.031 0.035 0.020 -0.026
D × R 0.023 −8.5 × 10−3 -0.012 −4.1 × 10−3
× Donated previously (R)
D -0.13 0.28 0.10 -0.021
R 0.027 0.073 0.021 0.087
D × R −5.4× 10−3 4.2× 10−3 −4.8× 10−3 −8.4 × 10−3
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.0001
TABLE S8. Logistic regression results for 2000–2012 for donation to the republican party as dependent variable, including
cross-exposure effects (i.e. effect of exposure to democratic donors on republican donation).
